Attacks and Defenses Against LLM Fingerprinting
About
As large language models are increasingly deployed in sensitive environments, fingerprinting attacks pose significant privacy and security risks. We present a study of LLM fingerprinting from both offensive and defensive perspectives. Our attack methodology uses reinforcement learning to automatically optimize query selection, achieving better fingerprinting accuracy with only 3 queries compared to randomly selecting 3 queries from the same pool. Our defensive approach employs semantic-preserving output filtering through a secondary LLM to obfuscate model identity while maintaining semantic integrity. The defensive method reduces fingerprinting accuracy across tested models while preserving output quality. These contributions show the potential to improve fingerprinting tools capabilities while providing practical mitigation strategies against fingerprinting attacks.
Related benchmarks
| Task | Dataset | Result | Rank | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fingerprint Spoofing | LLMmap official query set (8:2) | LLMmap Attack Success Rate (ASR)40 | 21 | |
| Fingerprint Spoofing | UltraChat (8:2) | MET ASR33.3 | 21 | |
| Cross-family weak-to-weak spoofing | LLMmap Gemma-2B to Qwen2-1.5B | ASR3.3 | 14 | |
| Fingerprint Spoofing | LLMmap (test) | ASR0.00e+0 | 14 | |
| Fingerprint Spoofing | MET on UltraChat (test) | ASR0.00e+0 | 14 | |
| Fingerprint Spoofing | LLM-idio on UltraChat (test) | ASR1.8 | 14 | |
| LLM black-box fingerprinting | LLM instances | Query Efficiency (Verification)8 | 12 | |
| Cross-family weak-to-weak spoofing | LLM-idio Qwen2-1.5B to Gemma-2B | ASR8.9 | 7 | |
| Cross-family weak-to-weak spoofing | LLMmap Qwen2-1.5B to Gemma-2B | ASR0.00e+0 | 7 | |
| Cross-family weak-to-weak spoofing | MET Qwen2-1.5B to Gemma-2B | ASR0.00e+0 | 7 |