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Revenue Maximization on Yao multi-bidder 2-item auctions b=4, a=3, p=0.3 2017 (discrete types)
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8
Revenue
RegretNet
7.824136
7.869793
7.91545
7.961107
Jun 8, 2026
Revenue
IC Violation
Updated 1mo ago
Evaluation Results
Method
Method
Links
Revenue
IC Violation
RegretNet
Number of Bidders (n)=8
2026.06
8
0.0363
Optimal (Analytical)
Number of Bidders (n)=8
2026.06
7.9996
-
Ours (Certified Bound)
Number of Bidders (n)=8
2026.06
7.9996
-
GemNet
Number of Bidders (n)=8
2026.06
7.9996
-
RegretNet
Number of Bidders (n)=5
2026.06
7.998
0.0396
Optimal (Analytical)
Number of Bidders (n)=5
2026.06
7.984
-
Ours (Certified Bound)
Number of Bidders (n)=5
2026.06
7.984
-
GemNet
Number of Bidders (n)=5
2026.06
7.983
-
RegretNet
Number of Bidders (n)=3
2026.06
7.837
0.0383
Optimal (Analytical)
Number of Bidders (n)=3
2026.06
7.8309
-
Ours (Certified Bound)
Number of Bidders (n)=3
2026.06
7.8309
-
GemNet
Number of Bidders (n)=3
2026.06
7.8309
-
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